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aBstract
The idea that our most basic duty is to treat each 
other with respect is one of the Enlightenment’s 
greatest legacies and Kant is often thought to be 
one of its most powerful defenders.  if Kant’s 
project were successful then the lofty notion 
that humanity is always worthy of respect would 
be vindicated by pure practical reason.  further, 
this way of defending the ideal is supposed to 
reflect our autonomy, insofar as it is always one’s 
own reason that demands that one treat human-
ity with respect.  in this article, i consider what 
i take to be one of the most important and com-
pelling attempts to defend the Kantian project. 
i draw the disappointing conclusion that this 
attempt does not succeed.  The reasons this at-
tempt fails shed some light on the difficulties 
facing any attempt to defend the Kantian proj-
ect.  
Key words: autonomy, humanity, practical rea-
son, respect
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in that of another always as an end 
and never as a means only.
immanuel Kant (Kant 1990, p.  46/429)
1.  The Regress Argument
perhaps the most influential argument for the Enlightenment ideal is what 
is usually referred to as the “regress ar-
gument”.  The regress argument begins 
from the premise that rational agents can 
stand back from their impulses and ask 
whether they are worth acting upon.  as 
rational agents we often take this reflec-
tive attitude, make choices on the basis of 
our reflection, and take those choices to 
be rational.  insofar as we take our choic-
es to be rational, it seems that we also 
must take the objects of those choices to 
be good in the sense of being choicewor-
thy.   Given that we take the objects of our 
rational choices are good, though, what 
should we suppose makes them good? 
The proponent of the regress argument 
suggests that the best explanation of the 
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goodness of an object of an agent’s rational choice is just that it is the object of rational 
choice.  for apparently the only alternative explanations involve an untenable form of 
moral realism, according to which the objects of rational choice must be valuable apart 
from being valued.  The proponent of the regress argument argues that this would be 
epistemologically mysterious1 and metaphysically extravagant.2
one way of framing this stage of the argument is as posing a question very much like 
the question socrates asked Euthyphro.3  socrates’ question was, “are pious things pi-
ous because the gods love them, or do the gods love them because they are pious?”  The 
proponent of the regress argument asks, “are good things good because we rationally 
choose them, or do we rationally choose them because they are good?”  The regress 
argument favors the first answer to this question on the grounds that the alternative 
answer commits one to a picture of moral properties that is metaphysically dubious and 
leaves us with no plausible epistemological story to tell about how we could come to 
know anything about such properties.  another Kantian motivation for this answer to 
the Euthyphro-like dilemma is the idea that the opposite answer would commit one to 
a form of heteronomy, insofar as the rational authority of morality would be imposed 
on the agent by moral facts “out there in the world.”  so long as we assume that ratio-
nal motivation must in some sense be self-legislated and not externally imposed, this 
would give us reason to prefer the Kantian account of the sources of normativity.  David 
cummiskey makes this point in pressing the regress argument:
in choosing to pursue an end, i am affirming that it is pursuit-worthy, 
that it is either instrumentally valuable or valuable as an end.  But as we 
have already seen, the action cannot be practically justified by an external 
law, because then it would not provide a reason for me to do the action.  
i thus cannot become obliged simply by recognizing a natural or non-
natural property.  The determining ground must be an internal source.  
(cummiskey 1996, p.  72)
once we allow that we must take this horn of our Euthyphro-like dilemma, the Kantian 
argues that we can then infer that rational nature is an end in itself.  christine Kors-
gaard puts the point as follows:
Kant saw that we take things to be important because they are important 
to us - and he concluded that we must therefore take ourselves to be 
important. (Korsgaard 1996b, p.  122)
Elsewhere, Korsgaard puts the point slightly differently:
1 see harman 1977, chapter one, for an argument in this vein.
2 see Mackie 1977 for a classic presentation of this worry.  Korsgaard seems to follow both Mackie and harman 
in these respects, though she does not think harman and Mackie’s worries undermine what she calls “procedural 
realism,” a view i briefly discuss in the text below. 
3 see plato 1961b.
M. ridge  Why Must We treat Humanity with respect? Evaluating the regress Argument 

Thus, regressing upon the conditions, we find that the unconditioned 
condition of the goodness of anything is rational nature, or the power of 
rational choice.  to play this role, however, rational nature must itself be 
something of unconditional value - an end in itself.  (Korsgaard 1996d, 
p.  123)
The basic idea is that for anything to be the unconditioned condition of the value of ev-
erything else, it must be unconditionally good.  if rational nature is this unconditioned 
condition, it would follow that it must be unconditionally good.
it will help to have a more formal reconstruction of the regress argument around which 
my discussion is structured:
(1)  in making a rational choice, a rational agent rightly judges the object of her choice 
to be good. [an analysis of what it is to make a rational choice]
(2) The best explanation of the object of a rational agent’s rational choice’s being good is 
simply that it is an object of a rational choice. [for the alternative explanation involves a 
epistemologically and metaphysically problematic form of moral realism]
∴ (3) The object of a rational agent's rational choice is good simply because it is the ob-
jects of a rational choice. [from 1 & 2, by way of an inference to the best explanation]
(4)  anything that is good is either the object of a rational choice or is rational agency 
itself. [follows from the rejection of realism that underwrites step (2) of the argument]
∴ (5) rational agency is the unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything else. 
[from 3 & 4 via conceptual analysis of what it is for something to be the unconditioned 
condition of the goodness of anything else]
(6)  for anything to be the unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything else, 
that thing itself must be unconditionally good.
∴ (7) rational agency is unconditionally good. [from 5 & 6]
The argument is intuitively powerful.  it is plausible to suppose that if things are valu-
able then they must be valuable because they are appropriately valued.  it would, how-
ever, seem odd to suppose that the appropriate valuations of rational agents underwrite 
the value of everything which is valuable, without rational agency itself being valuable. 
if rational agency is the condition of the value of everything else, then it seems plausible 
to infer that rational agency is itself good, and unconditionally so. 
2.  The Euthyphro Problem Revisited
in the first stage of the regress argument (steps (1) through (2)), premise (2) is clearly 
the key premise.  for once ‘good’ in (1) is read as simply as having roughly the same 
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meaning as ‘choiceworthy’ that premise should be fairly uncontroversial.  Whereas (2) 
seems to be a rather controversial philosophical thesis about the metaphysics of choice-
worthiness.  recall that (2) asserts that the object of a rational choice is good because 
it is rationally chosen rather than the other way around.  The standard defense of (2) 
assumes that anyone who takes the other horn of this Euthyphro-like dilemma must 
embrace some form of problematic moral realism.  i argue that this is not the case; we 
can embrace the other horn of the Euthyphro-like dilemma without embracing moral 
realism.
first, we must get a somewhat more clear idea of what ‘realism’ and its rivals claim. 
‘Moral realism’ and its cognates are terms of art that are used very differently by differ-
ent philosophers so we should see just what the proponent of the regress argument has 
in mind.  Korsgaard is admirably clear on this point:
The realist’s response is to dig in his heels.  The notion of normativity 
or authority is an irreducible one.  it is a mistake to try to explain it.  
obligation is simply there, part of the nature of things.  (Korsgaard 1996b,  
p.  30)
Moral realism on this account seems to be the thesis that moral properties (like the 
property of being obligated to perform a given action) are irreducible ones.  so, in 
particular, moral properties are not reducible to any natural properties.  Moral realism 
in this sense is therefore a species of G.E. Moore’s famous doctrine of non-naturalism 
(though Moore focused especially on the notion of being good as opposed to the no-
tion of being obligated).  indeed, Korsgaard cites Moore (as well as samuel clarke) as a 
paradigm instance of a realist view (see Korsgaard 1996b, p.  33)
The defender of the regress argument claims that if one rejects premise (2) of that ar-
gument then one is committed to moral realism in this sense.  to assess this claim, we 
must first see what the alternatives are to moral realism.  There is at least one other op-
tion worth considering here:  what simon Blackburn has termed “quasi-realism.”  The 
quasi-realist holds that when we are doing serious metaphysics we should not suppose 
that there really are moral properties out there in the world.  The quasi-realist shares the 
Kantian’s worries about non-naturalism (moral realism, in Korsgaard’s terms) and ar-
gues that naturalism fares no better for a variety of reasons.  following more traditional 
non-cognitivists like hare and stevenson, the quasi-realist holds that the primary func-
tion of moral utterances is to express our pro- and con-attitudes rather than to describe 
the way the world is. The point is often put in terms of the “direction of fit” of evaluative 
judgments.  While there are many different ways of cashing out the “direction of fit” 
metaphor, the basic idea is that beliefs are made “to fit the world,” whereas pro-attitudes 
are made “to make the world fit them.”4  if i believe that p but p is not the case, then it 
4 for a much more detailed investigation of the notion of a direction of fit, see humberstone 1992 and smith 1987. 
The classic treatment can be found in anscombe 1957.
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is my belief which needs to be changed.  Whereas if i desire that p but p is not the case, 
it is the world that needs to be changed.  i shall use ‘pro-attitude’ to refer to any state 
with the direction of fit of desire.5  With this explanation of our moral practice in hand, 
the quasi-realist goes on to show how we nonetheless can “earn the right” to the realist-
sounding discourse of ordinary language on a metaphysically slender basis.6  
We are now in a position to see where the case for premise (2) of the regress argument 
goes wrong.  for advocates of quasi-realism can consistently say things like, “The ob-
jects of our rational choice are good independently of our choice, and we rationally 
choose them because of their goodness.”  for on the quasi-realist account, such claims 
are themselves first-order claims and are to be understood as the expression of certain 
attitudes.  They might, for example, gloss such a claim roughly as the expression of a 
suitable pro-attitude toward norms holding that certain options are to be chosen inde-
pendently of whether anyone actually has chosen them.7  or perhaps they would gloss 
such a claim as the expression of a pro-attitude toward the promotion of certain ends 
regardless of whether anyone has a preference for the promotion of those ends.  These 
may not be the only ways in which a quasi-realist might gloss such claims, but they are 
representative.  after all, a chief virtue of quasi-realism is supposed to be its ability to 
mimic realist talk without taking on any of the difficult metaphysical and epistemo-
logical burdens that a full-blooded realist must embrace.  Whereas the defense of the 
regress argument’s premise (2) depends on the only alternative explanation of thing’s 
value being a problematic form of realism.  so if the defender of the regress argument 
wants to maintain this then she must explain why the quasi-realist is mistaken in think-
ing that they can say all these things.  as it stands, this is an argumentative burden that 
defenders of the regress argument have not explicitly tried to discharge.
it might be objected that if quasi-realism were true then moral rules would be heter-
onomous in a way that Kantians suppose is problematic.  for it might seem that on 
the quasi-realist view our moral judgments are externally imposed on us.  after all, 
the quasi-realist apparently supposes that our inclinations are our moral judgments, 
and Kant famously thought that our subjective inclinations are not part of our “true 
self ” unless we rationally endorse them, thereby incorporating them into our will.  This 
objection relies on the potentially problematic assumption that there is a deep distinc-
5 The choice is somewhat stipulative in part because one could just as easily have used the term ‘con-attitude’ 
here.  for there may be no important difference between having a pro-attitude toward p and having a con-attitude 
toward not-p.  since ‘pro-attitude’ is the more usual umbrella term for states with this direction of fit, i simply 
follow this orthodoxy.
6 simon Blackburn is the primary defender of quasi-realism.  see Blackburn 1984 and Blackburn 1993.
7 here, for example, is allan Gibbard’s discussion of an anorexic who prefers her starvation to a figure plump 
enough to sustain life:  “We do not think what she is doing is irrational simply in virtue of our own tastes or 
preferences in the matter.  nor do we think it is irrational in virtue of the norms we accept.  The norms we accept 
prohibit starving for a trim figure, regardless of what one prefers or what norms ones accept” Gibbard 1990, p. 166. 
see also Blackburn 1993.
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tion to be drawn between our inclinations and our will.  indeed, most quasi-realists 
are sympathetic to views in action theory that would naturally lead them to question 
this distinction.  however, even if we grant the Kantian that such a distinction can 
and should be drawn the objection does not seem to work.  We might also grant the 
seemingly implausible Kantian assumption that our inclinations are external to us in 
some problematic way unless we endorse them as worthy of satisfaction and thereby 
incorporate them into a maxim and grant the legitimacy of concerns about heteronomy 
(though it seems unlikely that anyone who denies those theses is thereby irrational). 
The crucial point is that the quasi-realist position, properly understood, is consistent 
with all of this.  for at least one possible version of quasi-realism would be the view that 
moral judgments are commitments of the will.  on this view, when i say “X is wrong,” i 
express a commitment of my will to avoid actions like X, rather than a mere sentiment, 
inclination, or desire not to X.  so long as the will has the same “direction of fit” as a 
desire, rather than the direction of fit of a belief, this will not be inconsistent with quasi-
realism, broadly construed.  for quasi-realism’s primary claim is that moral utterances 
serve to express pro- and con-attitudes rather than beliefs, where the defining mark of 
such attitudes is their direction of fit.  so long as the Kantian will has the right direc-
tion of fit, it will qualify in this very broad sense as a pro- or con-attitude.  Moreover, it 
is hard to see how anything recognizably described as “the will” could fail to have this 
direction of fit.  on any plausible account, willing is fundamentally more like desiring 
than it is like believing even if it is logically distinct from both.
alternatively, it might be objected that the quasi-realist’s reading of premise (2) of the 
regress argument gives it a first-order reading whereas it should be given a metaphysi-
cal or meta-ethical reading. indeed, insofar as rationalist arguments in general go from 
meta-ethical premises to first-order conclusions, in evaluating such arguments one 
must be vigilant for equivocations between meta-ethical and first-order readings.  if (2) 
is glossed as making the metaphysical claim that value judgments are in some meta-
physically weighty sense “made true by” rational-choice facts, then the quasi-realist 
might simply deny that (2) has such a reading in ordinary language and argue that the 
attempt to give philosophical sense to it in a way that will help the rationalist is unlikely 
to succeed.  however, the crucial point is what the quasi-realist should say about (2) 
if it is granted that it has an interesting meta-ethical reading.  for clearly the quasi-
realist must deny (2) thus understood.  They must deny (2) on this reading because 
their quasi-realism commits them to holding that there are no “truth-makers” for value 
judgments at all – our moral judgments do not represent a way the world is or might 
be, given their direction of fit, and hence are not the sorts of judgments that have truth-
makers.  similarly, if (2) makes the meta-ethical claim that ‘good’ means ‘rationally 
chosen’, then a quasi-realist need not accept (2), for quasi-realism entails no such analy-
sis.  so regardless of whether we read (2) as (i) a first-order claim about the conditions 
under which things are good, or (ii) a metaphysical claim about truth-makers of value 
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judgments, or (iii) a meta-ethical claim about the meaning of ‘good’, quasi-realists can 
happily reject (2), for all that has been said so far.
further, it is unclear how much room someone like Korsgaard, the most outspoken 
advocate of the regress argument, has for criticism of quasi-realism.  for her own view 
seems to be a form of quasi-realism, though she would no doubt resist this characteriza-
tion.  Korsgaard endorses the stock criticisms of realism but also clearly does not want 
to embrace naturalism (she seems to think that something like Moore’s open Question 
argument against naturalism is sound), apparently leaving her with quasi-realism by 
default. one might look to Korsgaard’s distinction between procedural and substantive 
realism for some guidance as to whether she is a quasi-realist, as she accepts procedural 
realism but rejects substantive realism.  here is her account of that distinction:
The procedural moral realist thinks that there are answers to moral 
questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them.  But 
the substantive moral realist thinks that there are correct procedures for 
answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts which 
exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures 
track.  (Korsgaard 1996b, pp. 36-37)
The problem with this account is that it simply pushes the question back a stage.  for 
now the obvious question for the procedural realist is what makes it true that one pro-
cedure is correct.  indeed, one might ask what it means to say that one procedure for 
answering moral questions is correct.  if the proceduralist strategy is redeployed to an-
swer these questions, then an infinite regress threatens. if it is not redeployed then the 
only other alternative to quasi-realism seems to be substantive realism at one remove.  
so the first problem with premise (2) of the argument is that it seems simply to over-
look the quasi-realist option - an odd oversight since in many respects quasi-realism 
is a view that Kantians should find attractive.  The Kantian defense of (2) faces another 
problem, though.  in rejecting the realist account of value in (2), the Kantian is commit-
ted to supposing that nothing could be valuable apart from its being rationally valued. 
for according to the argument to suppose otherwise is to land oneself in the epistemo-
logically and metaphysically murky waters of moral realism.  however, at the end of 
the day, it might seem that the Kantian does want to say just that, for the Kantian seems 
to suppose that humanity would be valuable even if nobody actually valued it.  for 
humanity’s value is supposed to be unconditional, where something’s value being un-
conditional consists in its being of value in all possible circumstances.  This, however, 
seems to entail that humanity is valuable quite apart from any agent’s rationally making 
it their end, insofar as rationally being made an end is presumably part of the circum-
stances in which humanity is sometimes contingently found.  This seems to commit 
the Kantian to supposing that something can be valuable apart from its actually being 
rationally valued, though, contra the Kantian defense of (2).  so the Kantian’s own po-
sition may face the same objections as those pressed against the moral realist.  to be 
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consistent, the Kantian must say that rational agency is valuable only if it is the object 
of rational choice, but this abandons the idea that it is good unconditionally.  The worry 
is structurally similar to a worry that faces some popular versions of the cosmological 
argument for the existence of God.  Just as some versions of the cosmological argument 
rely on the premise that everything must have a cause to the conclusion that there must 
exist a first cause that is itself uncaused, the regress argument seems to go from the 
premise that everything that is valuable must be valuable only because some condition 
is met (being the object of rational choice) to the conclusion that something must be 
valuable unconditionally.  in both cases, the argument’s conclusion is inconsistent with 
its main premise.  something has gone badly wrong.
Korsgaard has addressed this point in a symposium on her work in Ethics:
...in some of the essays in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, i talk about the 
value of humanity as if it were a form of intrinsic value, distinguishing 
the value of humanity in this way from the value of our particular ends...
More recently, especially in The sources of Normativity, i have come to 
think that the value we place even on ourselves is conferred...there is a 
continuity between the value of humanity and the value of other things:  
they are all the result of our own acts of conferring value.  (Korsgaard 
1998, p. 63)
perhaps this is compatible with the idea that humanity’s value is unconditional after all. 
for the idea may be that though the value of humanity is conferred it is not conditional 
because it is impossible for a rational agent to fail to value humanity.  actually, this still 
seems to make humanity’s value conditional but such that the condition on its value 
necessarily is satisfied whenever it exists.  let us put this worry to one side, though.  for 
this move would at least allow Korsgaard to claim that humanity is valuable in all pos-
sible circumstances, which is impressive and important enough.  for on this account, 
wherever one finds humanity, one would find humanity having rationally been made 
its own end.  however, the claim that it is literally impossible to fail to value human-
ity, would require a further argument.  The regress argument at most establishes that 
it is irrational not to value one’s own humanity, not that it is literally impossible.  for 
not valuing one’s own humanity intuitively does seem to be possible, and at least some 
Kantians would not want to deny this.8  indeed, Kantians have done an especially good 
job of emphasizing the importance of self-respect.  since failures of self-respect are 
most plausibly understood as failures to value one’s own humanity, the Kantian should 
be the last person to hold that it is literally impossible not to value humanity.  in any 
event (so far as i know) the advocates of the regress argument have provided no further 
argument for this impossibility claim.  indeed, if such an argument could be given then 
8 for example,  alan Donagan, at some points does seem to think a Kantian can allow for the possibility (though 
not the rationality) of complete indifference toward humanity.  see Donagan 1977.
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the regress argument itself would be otiose.  for in that case we could just appeal to that 
separate argument to show that insofar as we are rationally agents we literally cannot 
help but value humanity. 
3. Moorean Organic Unities.
Whatever one thinks of the first stage of the argument, the second stage is more clearly 
problematic.  let us for the sake of argument grant (4).  We may even grant that (5) 
follows from (3) and (4), so long as all we mean by that is that the thing, X, is itself a 
condition of the goodness of everything else and that there is no other condition that X 
must meet to serve as a condition for the goodness of everything else.  The key remain-
ing step of the argument is premise (6), which claims that if something is the uncondi-
tioned condition of the goodness of everything else, then it must itself be uncondition-
ally good.  in reconstructing the regress argument, i have flagged (6)’s justification with 
a question-mark.  for though (6) is clearly the main premise of the second stage of the 
argument, it is obscure what its justification is.  Though it sounds plausible, it is not as 
if it is self-evident.  one can perfectly well understand what (6) says and still be unsure 
of its truth.  Why should one suppose that simply because X is the condition for the 
goodness of everything else that X itself must be good at all, much less uncondition-
ally good?  G. E. Moore’s famous discussion of “organic unities” makes it clear that one 
need not draw such an inference (see Moore 1903).  as his discussion illustrates, one 
can consistently hold that something is part of a larger organic unity that is good, and 
be essential to that unity’s being good, without itself being good at all.  This is a limiting 
case of the more general point that the goodness of an organic unity is not reducible 
to the sum of the goodness of its parts.9  (6) implicitly rejects this possibility, but it is 
unclear why we should reject it. 
consider, by way of analogy, the view that the unconditioned condition of the good-
ness of everything is being the object of an inclination.  on this view, for anything 
other than an inclination that is good, it is good only insofar as it is the object of an 
inclination.  if we were to accept (6), we would have to infer from this that inclinations 
themselves must be unconditionally good, but this consequence just does not follow. 
it is perfectly consistent for someone to hold the view that so long as someone actually 
does have an inclination for something, that thing is ipso facto good, but also to hold 
that inclinations themselves are not only not good, but positively bad.  indeed, some 
of the stoics seemed to have held a view very much like this.  ironically, Kant himself 
seems to have held a view close to this, remarking that, “The inclinations themselves as 
the source of needs, however, are so lacking in absolute worth that the universal wish of 
9 Even critics of Moore’s more general thesis grant the possibility of such limiting cases as an uninteresting (even 
“trivial”).  see, for example, Zimmerman 1999.
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every rational being must be indeed to free himself completely from them”  (Kant 1990, 
p. 45).  it does not seem that my supposition that something is good only on the condi-
tion that somebody has an inclination for it commits me to supposing that inclinations 
themselves are good at all, much less unconditionally good.  for all that has been said 
so far, i might hold either that the inclinations themselves are indifferent, or even bad, 
in themselves.  similarly, it is coherent to suppose that rational agency might be the 
unconditioned condition of the value of everything else, but itself not have uncondi-
tional value.  so being the unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything else 
does not require unconditional value; the alternative is intelligible and even plausible 
in some cases.   
it is perhaps no surprise that Korsgaard criticizes Moore’s theory of organic unities 
(though she never considers the preceding objection itself).  in particular, she argues 
that, “Moore’s view, and the intuitionistic method of isolation, veil or obscure the in-
ternal relation within the organic unity in virtue of which the organic unity has its 
value” (Korsgaard 1996g, p. 271).  This may be a serious problem for Moore, given his 
particular characterization of intrinsic value as non-relational in its character and his 
famous attachment to an “isolation test” for such value.10  on its face, though, this is no 
reason to deny the possibility of organic unities, but is rather a complaint that Moore’s 
view obscures the internal relations of those unities.  let us grant that Moore himself 
could not explain the internal relations in virtue of which an organic unity (or its com-
ponents) has its (or their) value.  it would in no way follow that such an account cannot 
be given if we reject Moore’s account of intrinsic value and the associated “isolation 
test.”  so long as we understand the notion of an organic unity as the idea of a whole 
whose value is not reducible to the sum of the value of its parts, we can hold onto that 
notion without Moore’s other views.  only if we unnecessarily “load up” the concept 
of an organic unity with lots of Moorean assumptions that are actually inessential to it 
would worries about those assumptions translate into worries about the very idea of an 
organic unity.  for all that has been said so far, one could reject the Moorean baggage 
Korsgaard and others have attacked (i.e., his theory of intrinsic value and associated 
“isolation test,” as well as his non-naturalist realism and intuitionist epistemology) and 
still suppose that one thing (a) might be valuable in virtue of its relation to something 
else (B), even where this something else (a) is not itself unconditionally valuable.  Dif-
ferent philosophers may explain the relevant “in virtue of ” relation in different ways, 
but there is no apparent reason to suppose that any of the plausible specifications of the 
“in virtue of ” notion would preclude the sorts of value structures Korsgaard rules out. 
indeed, the ex ante denial of the possibility of such value structure may itself, “veil or 
obscure the internal relations within the organic unity in virtue of which the organic 
10 Very roughly, according to Moore’s isolation test, one determines whether something has intrinsic value by 
imagining a universe containing nothing but it with all its intrinsic properties intact, and then seeing whether it 
seems like there is anything of value in that universe - whether it would be rational to prefer it to a universe without 
the thing in question.  see Moore 1903.
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unity has its value” (Korsgaard 1996g, p.  271).  Whereas Moore may not make room 
for claims about the importance of the internal relations of an organic unity, the Kan-
tian view seems to suppose without argument that such internal relations cannot take 
certain forms.
4. Agent-Relativity, Agent-Neutrality, and Practical Identity.
recall that the regress argument is meant to show that an agent must treat humanity, 
whether in his own person or that of another, as an end in itself. however, the argument 
as i have reconstructed it seems only to support the conclusion that humanity has value 
of some sort, but leaves it open whether that value is agent-relative or agent-neutral. 
By speaking of a value as agent-relative i mean to indicate the principle underwriting 
that value makes ineliminable, non-trivial, pronominal back-reference to the agent for 
whom it is valuable, whereas a value is agent-neutral if that principle involves no such 
back-reference.  if, for example, the principle underwriting the value of pleasure is of 
the form, “an agent’s pleasure is always valuable for that agent,” then the value of plea-
sure is agent-relative.  if, by contrast, the principle in question were simply, “an agent’s 
pleasure is always valuable,” then the value of pleasure is agent-neutral.  The former 
principle gives an agent reason to promote pleasure only if the pleasure is her own but 
the latter principle provides an agent with reason to promote pleasure no matter whose 
it is.  for all that has been said so far, the regress argument might be taken to show that 
each agent must value his or her own humanity, but not show that one must also value 
the humanity of others.  for one might take the lesson of the argument to this point 
to be that insofar as i view something as good-to-me that i must do so on the basis of 
my rationally making it my end, and that i must therefore see my own rationality as 
good-to-me too.  one might allow that this argument goes through for every possible 
rational agent, and thereby respect a kind of universalizability.  Just as i must see my 
humanity as good-to-me, you must see your humanity as good-to-you, etc.  still, the 
sceptic might insist, none of this delivers the conclusion that each of must see human-
ity, whether in one’s own person or that of another, as always good as an end, simpliciter. 
The value of humanity might be purely agent-relative.
Korsgaard is well aware of this concern.  she argues (in Korsgaard 1996f) from a doc-
trine that she refers to as “intersubjectivism” to the conclusion that reasons for acting 
are not agent-relative.  as i understand her reply, it comes in two stages.  first, she ap-
peals to Wittgensteinian considerations to argue for the view she calls “intersubjectiv-
ism”  (Korsgaard 1996f, p.  278).11  second, she argues that intersubjectivism entails that 
all reasons must be reasons we can share, and so cannot be agent-relative.  one might 
11 here i am piecing together Korsgaard’s arguments in The sources of Normativity (Korsgaard 1996b) and the 
argument of “The reasons We can share: an attack on the agent-relative/agent-neutral value distinction”, Kors-
gaard 1996f.  
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naturally infer from this that Korsgaard holds the view that reasons are agent-neutral, 
given that the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is exhaus-
tive.  on the other hand, it might also seem a little perverse to interpret Korsgaard as 
arguing that all reasons are agent-neutral given that the subtitle of her paper is, “an 
attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values.”  actually, 
there seems to be a contradiction at the heart of Korsgaard’s paper.  on the one hand, 
she characterizes the conclusion of her argument as the thesis that, “values are nei-
ther subjective nor objective, but rather are intersubjective” (Korsgaard 1996f, p.  276). 
What, though, is meant by ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’?
in contemporary jargon, the question is whether reasons and values 
should be understood to be agent-relative or agent-neutral, or whether 
reasons and values of both kinds exist.  in slightly older terms, the 
question is whether reasons and values are subjective, existing only in 
relation to individuals, or objective, there for everyone. (Korsgaard 1996f, 
pp.  275-276)
This passage, combined with her characterization of her thesis as the doctrine that “val-
ues are neither subjective nor objective, but rather are intersubjective,” commits Kors-
gaard to arguing that the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is not exhaustive. on 
the other hand, Korsgaard also explicitly allows that the distinction is exhaustive:
James Drier has pointed out to me that in styling my project [sic.] an attack 
on the distinction between relative/subjective and neutral/objective, i 
might give the impression that i think this logical distinction is not logically 
exhaustive, which it obviously is. (Korsgaard 1996f, p.  303, n. 6)
in fact, Korsgaard not only “gives the impression” that she thinks the distinction is not 
exhaustive, she commits herself to arguing that it is not, as her subtitle would suggest 
when she goes on to hold that “values are neither subjective nor objective”. a more 
charitable interpretation might insist that Korsgaard is using ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
in a different sense than ‘agent-relative’ and ‘agent-neutral’ when she claims that values 
are neither subjective nor objective, but she never actually explicitly glosses ‘subjective’ 
and ‘objective’ in any way other than as being ‘older terms’ for the distinction marked in 
contemporary jargon by ‘agent-relative’ and ‘agent-neutral’.    so the discussion of Drei-
er’s point seems to vitiate the intended conclusion of the argument on its most obvious 
reading.  Moreover, Dreier is right that the relative/neutral distinction is an exhaus-
tive one; for any reason, either its articulation involves the relevant sort of pronominal 
back-reference or it does not.  it seems that Korsgaard really should be arguing that the 
reasons to respect humanity are agent-neutral rather than arguing that the agent-rela-
tive/agent-neutral distinction is not exhaustive.  indeed, at one point she comes very 
close to endorsing this reading herself, commenting that,
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it might be thought that i am defending this position:  that persons have 
agent-neutral value, while all other values are agent-relative.  and then i 
add that you express your sense of the neutral values of others by sharing 
in their agent-relative ends.  This is close to the Kantian position, but it is 
a misleading way to put it.  it makes the value of persons a metaphysical 
reality, perhaps in need of a metaphysical defense… (Korsgaard 1996f, 
pp.  300-301)
The reason Korsgaard finds this gloss on her view misleading is that the agent-neutral-
ity of the value of persons “makes the value of persons a metaphysical reality” but this 
does not actually follow from nagel’s official gloss of what it is for a reason to be agent-
neutral, which Korsgaard endorses.  Even a quasi-realist like Blackburn can allow that 
reasons are agent-neutral in nagel’s sense, as that will just be a first-order remark about 
whether reasons for one agent entail reasons for others.  so nothing metaphysical fol-
lows from the agent-neutrality of the value of persons.  Korsgaard’s discussion seems to 
equivocate between nagel’s official gloss of agent-neutrality and a more objectionably 
metaphysical conception which she finds implicit in nagel’s substantive discussion of 
agent-neutrality.  That these two notions of agent-neutrality are both in play in her 
discussion is also suggested by her reply to Dreier, in which she goes on to remark that, 
“My quarrel…is really with nagel’s account of the source of these reasons, which sug-
gests that values and reasons originate either from personal, idiosyncratic desires or 
from metaphysical realities of some kind” (Korsgaard 1996f, p. 303, n. 6).  if this is right 
then the issue becomes why Korsaard’s critique of these accounts of the sources of val-
ues and reasons would, if successful, entail that humanity is valuable has agent-neutral 
value in a sense which is not based on any problematic metaphysics, which seems to be 
her own view.  carefully distinguishing these different notions of agent-neutrality and 
agent-relativity and explaining how they are related to one another would have perhaps 
brought out some of the suppressed premises in Korsgaard’s argument.  in any event, 
Korsgaard is committed to arguing that the reasons to respect humanity are not agent-
relative in any of the senses she canvasses, and my objection to her larger argument is 
that she does not successfully defend this negative conclusion.  We can therefore avoid 
the question of just what positive characterization of such reasons Korsgaard should be 
defending.
let us grant that Wittgensteinian considerations establish intersubjectivism in Kors-
gaard’s sense.  on its face, this still leaves open the question of agent-relativity.  for 
intersubjectivism is an interpretation of what non-agent-relative reasons would be like 
if there are any.  intersubjectivism is defined via a contrast with a view Korsgaard calls 
Objective realism, according to which “values would exist in a world devoid of crea-
tures who see and respond to reasons” (Korsgaard 1996f, p.  278). The intersubjectivist 
account, by contrast, interprets those values as neutral with respect to the identity of 
individual agents, but not as existing independently of all agents as such.
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Korsgaard’s strategy seems to be to survey all the plausible sources of agent-relativity 
and argue that, in light of intersubjectivism, each fails to support agent-relativity.  in-
tersubjectivism apparently is the doctrine that each of us can always, in principle, make 
our values intelligible to others.  suppose, for example, that i have rationally made it 
my end to climb a mountain.  nagel takes this as a paradigmatic kind of agent-relative 
value, insofar as i have reason to promote my climbing the mountain, but nobody else 
has any reason to promote my doing so simply in virtue of the fact that i have made 
it my end.  on Korsgaard’s account, it seems that if i am rational, i must take it that 
mountain-climbing has value which anyone could appreciate, and simply wish to be 
the one who instantiates it.  to think otherwise would run afoul of intersubjectivism, 
for it would seem to entail that my values could not be made intelligible to others.  here 
is Korsgaard:
There are reasons for caring about these things, reasons which are 
communicable and therefore at least potentially sharable.  ask a mountain 
climber why she climbs and she need not be mute: she may tell you things 
about the enlarged vistas, the struggle with the elements, the challenge about 
overcoming fears or surpassing physical limitations.  she takes her desire to 
climb mountains to be a motivated desire, motivated by recognizably good 
features of the experience of climbing.  she does not take the value of the 
climb to be conferred on it simply by her desire to do it.  someone who says, 
‘i just want to’ is not offering you a reason; he is setting up a bulwark against 
incomprehension.  (Korsgaard 1996f, p.  289)
one problem i shall here put to one side is that this passage seems to imply the oppo-
site answer to the Euthyphro question to the one given in the first stage of the regress 
argument.  for the natural reading of this passage would be that the mountain climber 
rationally chooses her project because of it is independently good (in virtue of the sce-
nic vistas, the struggle with the elements, etc.) rather than its being good because the 
climber rationally chooses it.  let us put this prima facie tension to one side, though. 
Korsgaard in the following way: (a) intersubjectivism entails that all reasons must be 
communicable, (b) a reason is communicable only if it is sharable, and (c) an agent-
relative reason is not sharable.  Therefore, she concludes, reasons for acting are not 
agent-relative.  
The first move is plausible enough, but the latter stages are problematic.  for mere 
communicability does not entail sharability in any sense in which sharability would 
entail non-agent-relativity.  Granted, if you have reason to promote your climbing a 
mountain then you should be able to tell me what that reason is and even tell me why it 
counts as a reason for you to do it.  all of this seems consistent with my still supposing 
that i nonetheless have no reason to promote your climbing the mountain.  for your 
articulation of your reason and why you have it might, for all that has been said so far, 
be purely agent-relative.  you might even explicitly invoke some agent-relative theory 
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(egoism, say) in explaining why you have the reason you do, in which case i need not 
see your reasons as generating reasons for me, as i might be forced to do if the reasons 
were not agent-relative.  i might even fully appreciate your reason, and would aim to 
act on such a reason if i ever found myself in circumstances just like your own.  We can 
accept intersubjectivism without abandoning agent-relativity.
following Korsgaard, we might at this stage try to supplement the regress argument 
by appealing to the idea of a “practical identity.”  The main idea here is that insofar as 
we are rational each of us must have a practical identity, where a practical identity is a 
description under which one values oneself. however, Korsgaard argues, if we are to 
have any practical identity at all, at least part of that identity must be as human beings, 
and from this it is supposed to follow that we must value humanity, at least in our own 
person.  Korsgaard supports this latter claim by way of emphasizing that our ability to 
reflect on our ends and ask whether they really provide us with reasons is essential to 
our identity as rational agents.  if we are wondering about what to do, we must initially 
reject nihilism.  as Korsgaard puts it, if we are not to be complete normative sceptics, 
we must think it is possible for some of our actions to be worth doing.  it is somewhat 
tendentious to put this point in terms of each of us necessarily having a practical iden-
tity, where a practical identity is a conception of oneself under which one values one-
self.  for the latter characterization suggests that one values oneself as an end, but that 
does not follow from any platitudes about what follows from the rejection of nihilism. 
i might, e.g., reject nihilism and be a hedonistic utilitarian, and value only pleasure 
rather than people.  still, in an attenuated and stipulative sense we might grant that 
even the hedonistic utilitarian has a conception of himself under which he values him-
self, though strictly instrumentally – namely, as a potential promoter of happiness.
The next step in the argument is to establish that we must take our humanity as part of 
our practical identity in this sense.  here Korsgaard’s idea seems to be that our identity 
as rational agents is not contingent. There is an important truth here.  it is true that to 
have a practical identity, in the relevant sense, is to value oneself under some descrip-
tion, and to do this one must be capable of valuing.  insofar as it is plausible to suppose 
that only rational agents are capable of evaluative judgments, it is plausible that only 
rational agents can have practical identities.  however, it would be a mistake to infer 
directly from this that one must value one’s rational agency.  here it is important to note 
that talk of one’s ‘practical identity’ can be ambiguous.  on our canonical interpreta-
tion, a practical identity is a conception of an agent under which the agent values her-
self.  another related but distinct thing we might mean by talk of a ‘practical identity’ 
would be a conception of oneself that makes it possible for one to value anything at all. 
The preceding line of thought reveals the plausibility of supposing humanity is part of 
one’s practical identity in the second sense, but it does not follow from this that one’s 
humanity is part of one’s practical identity in the first sense. There seems to be a fallacy 
of equivocation between two senses of ‘practical identity’.
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or perhaps there is no fallacy, and Korsgaard is relying on the suppressed premise that 
anything that is part of one’s practical identity in the second sense must also be part of 
one’s practical identity in the first sense.  in this case, the suppressed premise stands in 
need of defense.  Prima facie, it seems perfectly coherent to regard a feature as essential 
to one’s being able to value things without concluding that the feature in question is 
itself valuable.  perhaps Korsgaard would argue that we must accept this relationship 
because we must come down a certain way on the Euthyphro problem.  since we must 
see things as valuable because we value them, rather than the other way around, we 
must “see ourselves as important,” and so must value our rational agency.  it should be 
clear from the preceding sections why this sort of move is problematic.   The appeal to 
practical identity faces precisely the same kinds of objections facing the regress argu-
ment.  nor should this come as a surprise, given that the appeal to practical identity 
is “just a fancy new model of an argument that first appeared in a much simpler form, 
Kant’s argument for his formula of humanity” (Korsgaard 1996b, p.  122).
Conclusion
sadly, the regress argument cannot vindicate the Kantian project.  at each stage the ar-
gument faces serious objections, and what seem to be the Kantian’s best replies to these 
objections are not compelling.  nor does supplementing the regress argument with an 
appeal to the idea of a “practical identity” seem promising.  if Enlightenment morality 
is true, its truth is not demonstrated by the regress argument.
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